According to IMDb, Beesley was on the set of "A Night to Remember," which is considered the most accurate of all Titanic films. He reportedly tried to jump into the scene depicting the ship's sinking, in order to symbolically go down with the ship. Legend has it that director Roy Ward Baker refused, as it would have been a union violation and could have halted filming.
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After the sinking of the Titanic, Brown became a full-fledged activist. She was a vocal supporter of the suffrage movement, worked with the Red Cross during World War I, and even ran for Senate, though she didn't win.
This photo was taken on April 15, 1912, the morning after the Titanic crashed, from a ship called the SS Prinz Adalbert. The photographer hadn't even heard about the Titanic sinking yet, he just noticed that it appeared to show signs of collision, including a streak of red paint.
The Nazi re-telling of the sinking of the Titanic attempted to blame the British for the sinking of the Titanic by pushing the ship to continue at full speed, despite the warnings of a (fictional) German First Officer who ostensibly was the only person aboard who cared about human life.
U-505 began her third patrol on 7 June 1942, after leaving her home port of Lorient. She sank the American ships Sea Thrush[9] and Thomas McKean and the Colombian Urious in the Caribbean Sea.[10] Urious was a sailing ship belonging to a Colombian diplomat, so its sinking gave Colombia political grounds to declare war on Germany.[11] U-505 then returned to Lorient on 25 August after 80 days on patrol without being attacked.[12]
Following the use of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany in the First World War, countries tried to limit or abolish submarines. The effort failed. Instead, the London Naval Treaty required submarines to abide by "cruiser rules", which demanded they surface, search[21] and place ship crews in "a place of safety" (for which lifeboats did not qualify, except under particular circumstances)[22] before sinking them, unless the ship in question showed "persistent refusal to stop...or active resistance to visit or search".[23] These regulations did not prohibit arming merchantmen,[24] but doing so, or having them report contact with submarines (or raiders), made them de facto naval auxiliaries and removed the protection of the cruiser rules.[25] This made restrictions on submarines effectively moot.[24]
German success in sinking Courageous was surpassed a month later when Günther Prien in U-47 penetrated the British base at Scapa Flow and sank the old battleship HMS Royal Oak at anchor,[27] immediately becoming a hero in Germany.
This was in stark contrast to the traditional view of submarine deployment up until then, in which the submarine was seen as a lone ambusher, waiting outside an enemy port to attack ships entering and leaving. This had been a very successful tactic used by British submarines in the Baltic Sea and Bosporus during World War I, but it would not work if port approaches were well-patrolled. There had also been naval theorists who held that submarines should be attached to a fleet and used like destroyers; this had been tried by the Germans during the Battle of Jutland with poor results, since underwater communications were in their infancy. The Empire of Japan also adhered to the idea of a fleet submarine, following the doctrine of Alfred Thayer Mahan, and never used their submarines either for close blockade or convoy interdiction. The submarine was still looked upon by much of the naval world as "dishonourable", compared to the prestige attached to capital ships. This was true in the Kriegsmarine as well; Raeder successfully lobbied for the money to be spent on capital ships instead.
It was in these circumstances that Winston Churchill, who had become Prime Minister on 10 May 1940, first wrote to President Franklin Roosevelt to request the loan of fifty obsolescent US Navy destroyers. This eventually led to the "Destroyers for Bases Agreement" (effectively a sale but portrayed as a loan for political reasons), which operated in exchange for 99-year leases on certain British bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda and the West Indies, a financially advantageous bargain for the United States but militarily beneficial for Britain, since it effectively freed up British military assets to return to Europe. A significant percentage of the US population opposed entering the war, and some American politicians (including the US Ambassador to Britain, Joseph P. Kennedy) believed that Britain and its allies might actually lose. The first of these destroyers were only taken over by their British and Canadian crews in September, and all needed to be rearmed and fitted with ASDIC. It was to be many months before these ships contributed to the campaign.
Pack tactics were first used successfully in September and October 1940 to devastating effect, in a series of convoy battles. On September 21, convoy HX 72 of 42 merchantmen was attacked by a pack of four U-boats, which sank eleven ships and damaged two over the course of two nights. In October, the slow convoy SC 7, with an escort of two sloops and two corvettes, was overwhelmed, losing 59% of its ships. The battle for HX 79 in the following days was in many ways worse for the escorts than for SC 7. The loss of a quarter of the convoy without any loss to the U-boats, despite a very strong escort (two destroyers, four corvettes, three trawlers, and a minesweeper) demonstrated the effectiveness of the German tactics against the inadequate British anti-submarine methods. On 1 December, seven German and three Italian submarines caught HX 90, sinking 10 ships and damaging three others. The success of pack tactics against these convoys encouraged Admiral Dönitz to adopt the wolf pack as his primary tactic.
In May, the Germans mounted the most ambitious raid of all: Operation Rheinübung. The new battleship Bismarck and the cruiser Prinz Eugen put to sea to attack convoys. A British fleet intercepted the raiders off Iceland. In the Battle of the Denmark Strait, the battlecruiser HMS Hood was blown up and sunk, but Bismarck was damaged and had to run to France.[44] Bismarck nearly reached her destination, but was disabled by an airstrike from the carrier Ark Royal, and then sunk by the Home Fleet the next day.[45] Her sinking marked the end of the warship raids. The advent of long-range search aircraft, notably the unglamorous but versatile PBY Catalina, largely neutralised surface raiders.
In June 1941, the US realised the tropical Atlantic had become dangerous for unescorted American as well as British ships. On May 21, SS Robin Moor, an American vessel carrying no military supplies, was stopped by U-69 750 nautical miles (1,390 km) west of Freetown, Sierra Leone. After its passengers and crew were allowed thirty minutes to board lifeboats, U-69 torpedoed, shelled, and sank the ship. The survivors then drifted without rescue or detection for up to eighteen days. When news of the sinking reached the US, few shipping companies felt truly safe anywhere. As Time magazine noted in June 1941, "if such sinkings continue, U.S. ships bound for other places remote from fighting fronts, will be in danger. Henceforth the U.S. would either have to recall its ships from the ocean or enforce its right to the free use of the seas."[50]
In May, King (by this time both Cominch and CNO) finally scraped together enough ships to institute a convoy system. This quickly led to the loss of seven U-boats. The US did not have enough ships to cover all the gaps; the U-boats continued to operate freely during the Battle of the Caribbean and throughout the Gulf of Mexico (where they effectively closed several US ports) until July, when the British-loaned escorts began arriving. These included 24 armed anti-submarine trawlers crewed by the Royal Naval Patrol Service; many had previously been peacetime fishermen. On July 3, 1942, one of these trawlers, HMS Le Tigre proved her worth by picking up 31 survivors from the American merchant Alexander Macomb. Shortly after, Le Tigre managed to hunt down the U-boat U-215 that had torpedoed the merchant ship, which was then sunk by HMS Veteran; credit was awarded to Le Tigre. The institution of an interlocking convoy system on the American coast and in the Caribbean Sea in mid-1942 resulted in an immediate drop in attacks in those areas. As a result of the increased coastal convoy escort system, the U-boats' attention was shifted back to the Atlantic convoys. For the Allies, the situation was serious but not critical throughout much of 1942.
In 1941, American intelligence informed Rear Admiral John Henry Godfrey that the UK naval codes could be broken. In March, 1942, the Germans broke Naval Cipher 3, the code for Anglo-American communication. Eighty percent of the Admiralty messages from March, 1942 to June 1943 were read by the Germans. The sinking of Allied merchant ships increased dramatically.
Late in the war, the Germans introduced the Elektroboot: the Type XXI and short range Type XXIII. The Type XXI could run submerged at 17 knots (31 km/h), faster than a Type VII at full speed surfaced, and faster than Allied corvettes. Designs were finalised in January 1943 but mass-production of the new types did not start until 1944. By 1945, just one Type XXI boat and five Type XXIII boats were operational.[citation needed] The Type XXIIIs made nine patrols, sinking five ships in the first five months of 1945; only one combat patrol was carried out by a Type XXI before the war ended, making no contact with the enemy.
At no time during the campaign were supply lines to Britain interrupted;[citation needed] even during the Bismarck crisis, convoys sailed as usual (although with heavier escorts). In all, during the Atlantic campaign only 10% of transatlantic convoys that sailed were attacked, and of those attacked only 10% on average of the ships were lost. Overall, more than 99% of all ships sailing to and from the British Isles during World War II did so successfully.[citation needed] 2ff7e9595c
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